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Abstract—Industrial Control System (ICS) protocols play an essential
role in building communications among system components. Recently,
many severe vulnerabilities, such as Stuxnet and DragonFly, exposed in
ICS protocols have affected a wide distribution of devices. Therefore, it is
of vital importance to ensure their correctness. However, the vulnerability
detection efficiency of traditional techniques such as fuzzing is challenged
by the complexity and diversity of the protocols.
In this paper, we propose to equip the traditional protocol fuzzing with
coverage-guided packet crack and generation. We collect the coverage
information during the testing procedure, save those valuable packets
that trigger new path coverage and crack them into pieces, based on
which, we can construct higher-quality new packets for further testing.
For evaluation, we build Peach* on top of Peach, which is one of the
most widely used protocol fuzzers, and conduct experiments on several
ICS protocols such as Modbus and DNP3. Results show that, compared
with the original Peach, Peach* achieves the same code coverage and
bug detection numbers at the speed of 1.2X-25X. It also gains final
increase with 8.35%-36.84% more paths within 24 hours and has exposed
9 previously unknown vulnerabilities.
Index Terms—Fuzzing, ICS Protocol, Vulnerability Detection
I. INTRODUCTION
Industrial Control System (ICS) refers to a system combining
hardware and software with network connectivity so as to support
critical infrastructure. In recent years, we have witnessed a wide
adoption of ICS, including energy, transportation, communications,
etc. To meet the demand of the developing industry, there is a
trend towards higher openness of ICS, with an increasing number
of ICS components available on the Internet. However, this openness
inevitably makes ICS, primarily due to greater awareness of ICS
protocols, easy prey for attackers who aim at compromising and
controlling those ICS devices. More concretely, ICS protocol is
designed to acquire measurements/status of remote physical devices
and control them via packets carrying special commands. The loose
protection of these protocols presents ICS to the miscreants low-
hanging fruits. Those severe security vulnerabilities revealed in ICS
protocols, such as Stuxnet [1], DragonFly [2], and their evolutions,
have affected a wide distribution of devices. Hence, guaranteeing the
correctness of those protocols is of imminent need.
Many techniques have been proposed to ensure the security of
those ICS protocols. Fuzzing, as an automated software testing
technique, has emerged as one of the most effective techniques for
detecting security vulnerabilities in real-world software. Given the
target program with parameters, fuzzers work as follows: generating
malformed inputs (as for ICS protocol programs, the protocol packet
can be considered as the input), feeding them to the program and
looking for abnormal behaviors such as crashes or hangs. Two
main approaches are utilized to generate those malformed inputs:
data mutation and data generation. Mutation-based fuzzers, such as
American Fuzzy Lop (or simply AFL) [3], generate new inputs by
randomly mutating existing inputs, while generation-based fuzzers,
including Peach [4] and Sulley [5] for protocol, construct inputs
by leveraging the knowledge of format specification provided by
users. Mutation-based fuzzers are popular due to their ease-of-use
and fantastic vulnerability-detecting power. Nevertheless, lacking
format specification, mutation-based fuzzers can easily get bogged
down because the validity verification code is a significant time
sink for them. Those applications that process highly-structured
inputs, such as protocol programs, make it a small probability of
success for them to discover vulnerabilities deep in the program
state space. As opposed to mutation-based fuzzers, generation-based
fuzzers are capable of generating valid inputs by utilizing the input
model, which specifies the format of the data chunks and integrity
constraints. Those generated valid inputs manage to carry the path
exploration beyond the parser code so that it is more likely to discover
vulnerabilities deep in the program’s processing logic.
In practice, those generation-based fuzzers such as Peach have
exposed plenty of vulnerabilities in ICS protocols. Even so, as for
fuzzing of complex ICS protocols, there remain two challenges
heavily limiting their effectiveness: (i) despite awareness of input
structure, due to lack of rational utilizable way, existing fuzzers
discard those previously generated valuable inputs which achieve new
code coverage; and (ii) the random and pointless generation strategy
makes it less likely to produce high-quality inputs that are capable
of digging into deep paths of protocol state space.
To tackle these problems, we present Peach*, an automated
fuzzing tool targeted for ICS protocol. The key innovation of Peach*
is that, instead of speeding up the input generation process to produce
more inputs as some existing fuzzing approaches, it proposes a
novel utilizable way to leverage those previously generated inputs
so as to generate more high-quality inputs. Through investigation
of diverse ICS protocols, we found that the construction rules of
different types of protocol packets may have something in common:
some chunks, that belong to different types of ICS protocol packets,
may conform to similar/same construction rules. Moreover, those
different types of packets usually exercise different program traces in
the protocol application. Based on this feature, Peach* is designed
as follows: (i) Empowered by instrumentation, Peach* monitors
the program execution path taken by each generated input, and
identifies those inputs that contribute to new code coverage. (ii) To
learn from the success of those valuable inputs, Peach* constructs
a corpus by cracking them into pieces based on the information
of file format. These pieces can be used as donors to rule out
some meaningless repetitions of path exploration. (iii) To this end,
Peach* applies a novel semantic aware generation strategy. Instead
of starting from scratch, it derives new inputs by selecting appropriate
pieces from the constructed corpus in preference to instantiation from
the input model.
We implemented Peach* on top of Peach and evaluated its
performance on several well-fuzzed and open-source implementations
of widely-used ICS protocols – Modbus [6], DNP3 [7] and so on.
Experimental results demonstrate that, compared with the original
Peach, Peach* outperforms in terms of fuzzing speed (1.2X-25X, an
average of 5.7X) as well as path covered (8.35%-36.84%, an average
of 27.35% increase) within a time limit of 24 hours. Furthermore,
along with the coverage improvement, Peach* has already exposed
9 previously unknown vulnerabilities in those well-known protocols,
most of them are on the attack surface thus security-critical.
II. GENERATION-BASED FUZZING
Fuzzers treat the input file as a vector of input bytes thus the
modifications on the seed (the test case generated by fuzzers are
also called “seed”) file mainly concentrate on bits/bytes such as
bit-flip and splice, etc. For better effectiveness of protocol fuzzing,
generation-based fuzzers work on the file structure that is organized as
a tree where individual nodes are called chunks and different chunks
conform to its own format specification described in the configuration
file (e.g., Peach Pit [4] for Peach). Figure 1 shows a simple data
model which contains four attributes: ID, Size, Data, and CRC.
Specifically, Data consists of three individual chunks. The Size
field is a variant that is computed by the Relation function sizeof
and carries the size of Data field. The CRC field supports the error
check mechanism by the Fixup function Crc32Fixup.
7KH'DWD0RGHO
,' 6L]H 'DWD &5&
&RPSUHVVLRQ&RGH 6DPSOH5DWH ([WUD'DWD
3LW 5HODWLRQ
VL]HRI
)L[XS
&UF)L[XS
Fig. 1: Simple data model M used in Peach, illustrated as a tree.
Those generation-based fuzzers construct seeds or packets by
leveraging the above tree format. Algorithm 1 provides an overview
of the process. In the beginning, the fuzzer is provided with a format
specification G, and the detailed data model set can be extracted
from it (line 2, one format specification usually contains several data
models, used for producing different types of valid inputs). Then the
fuzzer works in a continuous loop unless timeout or aborted (lines 3-
12). For each iteration, it works as follows: it first selects one data
modelM from set (line 4), and then analyzes the chunks required to
generate by traversing the format tree specified by M and collects
the individual nodes as implemented in method ANALYZE (line 5). In
general, those chunks adhere to specified data types such as String,
Number, etc, and they are generated separately based on their data
types in conjunction with given functions (e.g., Relation, Fixup in
Figure 1) with params, and new seed is thus produced by jointing
them in the order declared inM (lines 7-9). The method GENERATE
implements data generation based on pre-defined rules. For example,
Peach implements generation by those Mutators that are designed
for different data types. As a general view, Mutator generates data
in these ways: random generation, mutation on default value and
mutation on existing chunks (those from user-provided initial seeds
or previously generated seeds). New generated seed is further utilized
to run the target application and those seeds that crash or hang the
protocol program are recorded for further processing (lines 10-12).
III. MOTIVATION
Despite awareness of input structure, some research infers that, due
to the unique random generation strategy, generation-based fuzzers
Algorithm 1: Generation-Based Fuzzing
Input: G: input model specified by format specification
Input: P : program under test
Output: C7 : seeds that crash or hang the program P
1 C7 ← ∅
2 SM = EXTRACTDATAMODEL(G) // Data Model Set
3 while true do
4 M← CHOOSE(SM)
5 Chunks← ANALYZE(M)
6 seed← null
7 for Chunk ∈ Chunks do
8 component← GENERATE(M, Chunk)
9 seed← JOINT(seed, component)
10 Results← RUNTARGET(P, seed)
11 if CRASH(Results) or HANG(Results) then
12 C7 ← C7
⋃
{seed}
such as Peach and Defensics [8] may not perform very well on
complex ICS protocols or reveal the bugs hidden in the deep paths [9].
Since the generation of test cases is inherently random, we can
consider the generation-based fuzzing as the following model: given
the format specification, equivalently, those fuzzers are provided with
the universal set SI of all legal seeds. In each iteration of input
generation, they can be regarded as choosing one seed from SI
randomly as the program input. Hence, in theory, if given enough
time and resources, those fuzzers are able to enumerate all possible
situations exhaustively and detect all potential bugs. However, this
ideal case is usually unreachable as the set SI can be infinite
and the budgets are constrained forever. It is our hope to make
intelligent design decisions with optimal strategies wherever possible.
Through investigation of diverse ICS protocols, we found that it
is possible to augment existing generation-based fuzzers with some
guided information for further improvement.
ICS protocol is designed for a specific domain – industry control,
thus it possesses some specific features compared with other common
internet protocols. From the perspective of the field in the packet,
these protocols employ a special field to identify different packets,
called “function code” field (or “opcode” field) that encodes the
instruction to be performed by the devices, such as restart, write
inner register, report self status and so on. More importantly, after
diving into the input model used in ICS protocols, we found that
different types of packets would trigger different traces, but they
would share similar data chunks which would trigger similar parsing
code. Hence, we can replace the traditional data model based random
generation with the coverage guided packet crack and generation to
improve the fuzzing speed and depth. We use Figure 2 to illustrate
our insights in detail.
For a data model M, the organizing mode as a tree can be
translated into the linear model ML similar to Figure 2(a), where
the individual nodes of tree take up in line with the order specified
in M. As a consequence, Figure 2(a) shows the organization of
three types of packets with different opcode values. Each rectangle
represents the construction rule of the chunk as defined in M. In
light of our investigation, we found that some chunks that belong
to different types of packets may conform to similar or same
construction rules (chunks with the same color in Figure 2(a) means
they conform to similar construction rules). For instance, as shown
in Figure 2(a), the chunks generated by Rule α1 can also be parsed
by Rule α2 smoothly in most cases, and vice versa. In particular,
the rectangle with dashed outline refers to Fixup mechanism such
as Crc32Fixup shown in Figure 1. This feature is also reflected
in the Control Flow Graph (CFG) of the packet processing part in
the protocol program and Figure 2(b) shows the detail. Different
types of packets can cause different execution traces (indicated as
different colors), but those traces may contain some shared code
blocks used to decode corresponding chunks. The code blocks of
different traces may not be shared, but they may act similarly because
they are used to parse those chunks generated by similar rules.
Taking the packets in Modbus [6] for example, those operations such
as calculating the mapping address, calculating the data to write,
constructing a response message are all required for the packets
of write single register and write single coil. The
only difference between them is the place to write, one for register
while another for coil.
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Fig. 2: Peach* insights. Crack those packets that trigger new path
into pieces, and construct higher quality new packets based on
these pieces to trigger more new paths in the control flow graph.
Based on this feature, we argue that the specification in the data
model can be further exploited for optimization. Since different types
of packet represent different commands and these different commands
require different parameters, the construction rules of these packets
can be regarded as different data models. Assuming that there are n
types of packets (usually denoted by the legal values of the opcode
field) in some ICS protocol, their data models can be donated as
M1,M2, ...,Mn. If one seed Iv generated by Mi is valuable
(usually labeled as valuable when a new path is triggered), then,
based on the similarity of different chunks, the cracked chunks of
Iv can be utilized to help optimize path exploration when generating
inputs using other data models Mj(1 ≤ j ≤ n, j 6= i). Based on
this, we can implement a more efficient packet generation strategy.
IV. SYSTEM DESIGN
In this section, we first introduce the workflow of Peach*. Then,
we present the details of each component.
A. Peach* Overview.
To illustrate the workflow and detailed design of Peach* better,
we first introduce the following two definitions.
Definition 1: Instantiation Tree. The Instantiation
Tree (or InsTree for short) of the data model M has the same
structure as the data model tree (e.g. Figure 1 shows a data model
tree). The only difference is that, the individual nodes of the data
model tree are construction rules of corresponding chunks, while the
homologous individual nodes of InsTree are instantiations of these
construction rules, namely realistic data chunks.
Definition 2: Puzzle. One puzzle refers to a combination of
all the individual nodes of any sub-tree of the InsTree, and these
chunks are organized in order as described in the data model. Suppose
that the individual nodes of the tree shown in Figure 1 are all replaced
with realistic data chunks, then those individual nodes ID, Size
are both puzzles, and the combination of those atomic chunks
CompressionCode, SampleRate and ExtraData in order is
also one puzzle.
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Fig. 3: Peach* fuzzer overview, including coverage based valuable
packets identification, packet cracking to get useful puzzles, and
semantic aware new packets generation with necessary fixup.
Figure 3 describes the system overview of Peach*, which works
as follows: the fuzzing routine takes the same input as those tradi-
tional generation-based fuzzers, a target protocol program and packet
format specification, and then runs in a continuous loop. Initially, the
puzzle corpus is vacant, and Peach* generates new seed I in the
Testcase Generator module by leveraging the format specification
alone with the inherent generation strategies of Peach, and the File
Fixup module is needless at this stage. Once a new seed is generated,
it is then used to run the target program for potential vulnerability
detection. Moreover, lightweight instrumentation is inserted into the
target program to obtain coverage information, based on which,
Peach* is able to identify I’s contribution to new code coverage.
Peach* retains I if it is valuable, and then cracks I into puzzles
by the File Cracker module based on the format specification. In
this case, the puzzle corpus becomes available, and the Testcase
Generator module employs a new generation strategy (called “se-
mantic aware generation strategy”) to take full advantage of this
corpus. Meanwhile, the seeds generated by this new strategy may
be illegal, and the File Fixup module is used to repair it to ensure
validity. In the design of Peach*, the puzzle corpus is available
by File Cracker only in the case that a valuable seed is detected
based on the feedback collected from the target program. Thereafter,
in the following iteration of seed generation, the proposed generation
strategy will be employed. Otherwise, the generation strategy to apply
remains inherent. Peach* consists of three main components as
shown in Figure 3: (1) collecting coverage information and detecting
valuable seed; (2) cracking valuable seed into puzzles; (3) applying
semantic aware generation with necessary file repairment. In the
following sections, we dive into details of the design of each part.
B. Valuable Seeds Identification
Code coverage information is a feedback that is wildly used in
traditional software unit test generation [10] and has been confirmed
effective. Hence, as shown in the component (1) in Figure 3, we try
to augment the traditional generation-based fuzzers with a feedback
loop, and use the code coverage as the feedback to evaluate whether
a seed is valuable. We use the edge coverage and obtain this
information by injecting instrumentation at branch points in the target
protocol program as follows:
 
cur_location = <COMPILE_TIME_RANDOM>;
shared_mem[cur_location ˆ prev_location]++;
prev_location = cur_location >> 1;
 
The variable cur_location, with a random value generated
during compilation time, is used to specify the basic block. The
shared_mem[] array is a shared memory region used to track
coverage. (A >> 1) ⊕ B, a kind of hash for simplification, can be
thought of as an edge from basic block A to B, and the byte set at this
position in shared_mem[] records the times of transition from A to
B. Empowered by instrumentation, Peach* can track the execution
flow exercised by the newly generated seed I, and determine whether
I reaches a new program execution state that has not appeared before.
If so, the seed I is considered valuable and would be cracked into
puzzles to improve the generation of new seeds.
C. Packet Cracker
Algorithm 2: File Cracker Algorithm
Input: G: input model specified by format specification
Input: Iv: valuable seed detected
Output: Corpus: set of puzzles after crack
1 Algorithm
2 Corpus← ∅
3 SM = EXTRACTDATAMODEL(G)
4 for M∈ SM do
5 InsTree← PARSE(M, Iv)
6 if LEGAL(InsTree) then
7 Root← GETROOT(InsTree)
8 DFS(Root)
9 Procedure DFS(TreeNode)
10 SubTreePuzzle← ∅
11 Children← GETCHILDREN(TreeNode)
12 if Children is empty then
13 SubTreePuzzle← GETCONTENT(TreeNode)
14 else
15 for Child ∈ Children do
16 SubTreePuzzle←
JOINT(SubTreePuzzle,DFS(Child))
17 Corpus← Corpus
⋃
SubTreePuzzle
18 return SubTreePuzzle
To make the best of the detected valuable seed Iv , we design
the File Cracker module to split it into puzzles. Algorithm 2
provides an overview of this module. Given the format specification
G, we first extract the detailed data model set (line 3) and try to
use these models to crack Iv one by one (line 4). For the selected
model M, the method PARSE implements the parse of Iv and
obtains Instantiation Tree InsTree (line 5). If InsTree
is legal (line 6), we use Depth First Search (DFS) algorithm to
traverse InsTree and collect the puzzle corpus from each sub-
tree (lines 9-18). For the sub-tree with root TreeNode, if it is an
individual node, the puzzle represented by this sub-tree is the chunk
content of itself (lines 12-13); otherwise, if it is an internal node,
then the puzzle is the combination of the puzzles of its child
nodes (lines 14-16). For instance, assuming that the tree shown in
Figure 1 is Instantiation Tree, then the puzzle of sub-
tree with root ID is itself and the puzzle of sub-tree with root
Data is the combination of CompressionCode, SampleRate
and ExtraData. To ensure the order of chunks in puzzle, the
order to traverse (line 15) should adhere to the format specification.
After obtaining the puzzle corpus of the detected valuable seed
Iv , the new proposed generation strategy – semantic aware generation
strategy, will be applied in the following iteration of test case
generation based on this high-quality corpus.
D. Semantic Aware Generation and File Fixup
As mentioned in the motivation section, though different types of
packets exercise different program paths, there are some chunks in
them conforming to same/similar construction rules and parsing code
blocks. Motivated by this, we argue that, a valuable seed Iv with one
value of the opcode can be used to optimize seed generation for other
values of the opcode. More specifically, the puzzles produced by
cracking Iv can be donated to the data model that used to generate
packets with other values of the opcode. Algorithm 3 provides our
semantic aware generation strategy.
Algorithm 3: Semantic Aware Generation Algorithm
Input: ML: linear data model
Input: Corpus: puzzle corpus
Output: Seeds: set of seeds generated
1 Algorithm
2 Seeds← ∅
3 Size← GETSIZE(ML)
4 Construct(1, Size,∅)
5 Procedure Construct(CurPos, Size, CurSeed)
6 if EQUAL(CurPos, Size+ 1) then
7 Seeds← Seeds
⋃
CurSeed
8 else
9 Rule← GETCONSTRUCTIONRULE(ML, CurPos)
10 Candidates← GETDONOR(Rule, Corpus)
11 if Candidates is not empty then
12 for Candidate ∈ Candidates do
13 Construct(CurPos+ 1, Size,
JOINT(CurSeed, candidate))
14 else
15 Construct(CurPos+ 1, Size,
JOINT(CurSeed,GENERATE(Rule)))
16 return
For Algorithm 3 in detail, given the linear data model ML and
constructed puzzle corpus, we first get the number of chunks
required to generate (line 3) and then construct seeds in a recursive
way as implemented in the procedure Construct: we construct
each data chunk in order until all of their values are assigned (line 6).
For each chunk to generate, the construct rule is extracted from
ML (line 9) and the subset of Corpus containing puzzles that
conform to this rule is marked as Candidates (line 10). Those
puzzles in Candidates are used to initialize this field one by
one when Candidates is not empty (lines 11-13). Otherwise, we
use the inherent Rule to provide the content of this field (lines 14-
15). Suppose there are only two fields, namely a and b, in some ICS
protocol packet, and the size of the set Candidates of field a is p
while the size of Candidates of b is q (if the set Candidates
is empty, then the size is considered as 1 because the inherent
construction rule will be applied). Then p × q new seeds will be
generated by our generation strategy.
After obtaining new seeds, we need to apply necessary file fixup
for them. Protocol packets usually employ integrity constraints, such
as size-of, length-of, and checksums, to ensure data integrity. The
integrity of the seeds generated by our strategy may be compromised,
therefore, we design the File Fixup module to re-establish their
integrity. Actually, we can use the Fixup and Relation mechanism
of Peach directly for file repair.
V. EVALUATION
We have implemented a prototype of Peach* based on the widely
used generation-based fuzzer Peach 3.0.202 [4]. In Valuable Seeds
Identification part, we implemented Peach*-clang, which is a
wrapper of clang and enables inserting an additional LLVM pass
to under-test-program to collect coverage information. The Packet
Cracker part added a memory to store all the chunks of the seed being
generated and utilized this stored chunk corpus to build puzzle
corpus. For the Semantic Aware Generation and File Fixup part, we
added a new generation strategy for Peach as stated in Section IV-D,
and the File Fixup module is based on the fixup mechanism of Peach.
We evaluate Peach* experimentally to answer the following two
research questions:
1) Is Peach* more efficient than Peach, when augmented with
the coverage guided packet crack and generation?
2) Is Peach* effective in exposing previously unknown vulnera-
bilities in real-world ICS protocol applications?
A. Experiment setup
We evaluated the performance of Peach* on several open-source
ICS protocol projects, including libmodbus [6], IEC104 [11], li-
biccp [12], opendnp3 [7], libiec61850 [13], and lib60870 [14]. Those
ICS protocols with different code scales are widely applied in various
industrial scenarios at present.
We used the path coverage achieved and the number of detected
unique bugs as metrics. The first metric is commonly used to
measure the effectiveness of fuzzers while the second metric indicates
the ability to detect vulnerabilities. For comparison, we added the
path coverage framework on both Peach* and Peach to obtain
the coverage ratio while fuzzing. We used the existing pit file of
Peach, which specifies the input format and is a requisition for Peach
execution. In real practice, the input model does not have to be
elaborate, explaining those key information such as coarse-grained
data chunk information is enough.
B. Fuzzing Performance
We ran each fuzzing tool on each selected project with a 24-
hour time budget and repeated each 24-hour experiment 10 times to
establish statistical significance of results. Figure 4 plots the average
number of paths covered for each project and fuzzing tool.
Figure 4 demonstrates that, on all the selected projects, Peach*
achieves the upper bound in path coverage with a rapid increase,
showing a sizeable lead on these projects. These projects are represen-
tative because they are widely used and also own diverse complexity
and code scale, which is also reflected in the paths covered after
24 hours as shown in Figure 4 – Peach*, as well as Peach, can
achieve thousands of paths on project libiec61850, while hundreds
of paths for opendnp3 and dozens of paths for IEC104. Take the
result of libiec61850 as an example, because of the largest scale
of project code, the paths covered of libiec61850 is increasing all
the time during our 24-hour experiment. Still, Peach* achieves an
average of 8.35% more paths covered than Peach after 24 hours,
showing its wide applicability and scalability.
(a) libmodbus (b) IEC104
(c) libiec61850 (d) lib60870
(e) libiccp (f) opendnp3
Fig. 4: Average number of paths covered by Peach* and Peach
within 24 hours for 10 repetitions on each ICS protocol program.
We can also infer from the figure that, both Peach* and Peach are
effective at the beginning of execution, showing a rapid increase in
path coverage. However, after a while, Peach tends to get bogged
and reach a state where path coverage becomes hard to grow
ever since, while the coverage-guided packet crack and generation
strategy of Peach* can help alleviate this situation by sustainedly
providing high-quality seeds. Overall, compared with the original
Peach, Peach* achieves the same code coverage at the speed of
1.2X-25X. Within 24 hours, it also gains sustained increase with
27.35% more paths on average (up to 36.84% for a single project).
This is a dramatic improvement in performance because, as suggested
by some prior works, after a certain amount of coverage is achieved,
even small increases in code coverage can yield more vulnerability
detection ability [15].
The experiment results confirm that, the coverage guided packet
crack and generation strategy is valuable and makes a significant
contribution by accelerating fuzzing and exploring more paths within
a limited time period. This improvement owes to Peach*’s capability
that identifies valuable seeds and applies file crack along with
semantic aware generation to learn from the success of these valuable
seeds, making more high-quality seeds appear at an early stage.
C. Previously Unknown Vulnerabilities
Along with the coverage improvement, Peach* has detected 9
previously unknown security vulnerabilities in those extensively used
open-source implementations. Table I summarizes those confirmed
vulnerabilities detected by Peach* and corresponding patches from
vendors are released or in progress. The column “Vulnerability Type”
indicates the cause of vulnerabilities.
TABLE I: Vulnerabilities Exposed by Peach*
Project Vulnerability Type Number Status
lib60870 SEGV 3 Confirmed
libmodbus
Heap Use after Free 1
Confirmed
SEGV 1
libiec iccp mod
SEGV 3
Confirmed
Heap Buffer Overflow 1
These bugs exposed by Peach* cause potential hazards to the
devices that running those ICS protocols. For example, Listing 1
illustrates a segmentation violation (SEGV) vulnerability found in
the lib60870. We used GNU Project Debugger (gdb) to analyze this
vulnerability, as shown in Listing 2. The bug occurs in the function
CS101_ASDU_getCOT, which tries to calculate the return value
using part of the received packet’s ASDU field without verification.
Hence, when the particular field is malformed or missing, the program
will access an illegal memory location, thereby resulting in a bad
address operation and leading to a segmentation fault. If this bug is
exploited for malicious proposes, the servers that run this protocol
may encounter a crash, causing an immediate shutdown to the whole
system. This bug has been confirmed and fixed by the vendor.
 
306 CS101_ASDU_getCOT(CS101_ASDU self)
307 {
308 return (CS101_CauseOfTransmission) (self->asdu[2] &
0x3f);
309 }
 
Listing 1: Code snippet of lib60870
 
Thread 5 "simple_server" received signal SIGSEGV,
Segmentation fault.
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV /root/temp/iec/lib60870/
lib60870-C/src/iec60870/cs101/cs101_asdu.c:308:47 in
CS101_ASDU_getCOT
 
Listing 2: A segmentation violation vulnerability in lib60870
VI. RELATED WORK
Grammar-based fuzzers generate inputs by leveraging the given
context-free grammar [16], [17], [18]. These fuzzers are also capable
of producing valid inputs within the grammar model. However, due
to the limitation of context-free grammar, these fuzzers have trouble
in encoding those integrity constraints such as size-of, checksums,
all of which are wildly used in ICS protocol programs.
Symbolic execution has been widely utilized to optimize fuzzing
tools [19], [20]. To maximize code coverage, these tools utilize sym-
bolic execution by collecting constraints along unexplored program
path and generating inputs that satisfy those constraints. However, the
application of symbolic execution is challenged by the path explosion
problem, especially for those large programs such as ICS protocols
running in an industrial production environment [21].
Recently, mutation-based fuzzers [3], [22] have also been widely
adopted in practice for traditional software testing. Being unaware
of file format, those fuzzers remains limited in generating valid
inputs and covering large regions of code, especially for protocol
programs that process highly-structured packets. To deal with this,
several recent research, such as Polar [9], focuses on the critical
information in the protocol. Polar augments mutation-based fuzzers
with the function code information as well as security-sensitive points
detected in the protocol program to optimize fuzzing. However, it is
challenging to obtain drastic effectiveness due to limited awareness
of the packet format, and our work focuses on optimizing generation-
based fuzzers with guided packet crack and generation.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present Peach*, a coverage-guided generation-
based fuzzing tool for ICS protocol vulnerability detection. Based
on coverage information collected during fuzzing, Peach* is able
to identify those valuable seeds that achieve new code coverage,
then it constructs a corpus based on the cracked packet pieces and
applies semantic aware generation strategy to optimize the input
generation process. We implemented Peach* on top of Peach and
evaluated it on several widely used ICS protocols such as Modbus
and DNP3. Compared with the baseline Peach, Peach* manages
to achieve higher path coverage at a faster speed and has exposed
9 previously unknown bugs. Peach* is fully automatic and has
also been applied to many other ICS protocols such as s7comm
for vulnerability detection. Our future work mainly focuses on two
aspects: the first is to extend the instrumentation module by utilizing
those binary instrumentation tools like PIN [23], and the second is to
customize our work into other generation- or mutation-based fuzzers.
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